The 21 st Century will be an era of persistent, full-spectrum conflict ranging from peaceful competition to general war. Military conflict in this era will encompass the full spectrum of operations to include offensive, defensive, and stability operations. In the past decade the Army has demonstrated its competence in offensive and defensive operations, but has struggled to develop competency in stability operations. The Army must develop a core competency in stability operations equal to that which it currently has in combat operations. To do this, the Army must determine jurisdiction over the tasks inherent in the mission as a means of identifying where in the Institution the skills and expertise reside. The paper will identify that these tasks require skill and expertise that are resident in certain Army branches. The Army must assess its strategic leadership capacity in those branches to determine whether core competency can be claimed. The paper takes the position that current strategic leadership is not sufficiently diverse in the professional skills and expertise that stability operations require. The
Army should address the challenge of attaining core competency in stability operations by seeking "whole of Army" solutions through the Army Enterprise.
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IN STABILITY OPERATIONS: A CHALLENGE TO ARMY ENTERPRISE
My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support for the capabilities needed to win today's wars and some of their likely successors.
-Secretary Of Defense Robert Gates 1
For the foreseeable future, the United States will likely be engaged in an era of political instability and persistent conflict which will encompass the full spectrum of military operations. These operations will range from high intensity offensive operations to lower intensity defensive operations to what have come to be known as stability operations. Though the Army has had much success in prosecuting the high to medium intensity offensive and defensive operations of the wars it has fought these last eight years, it has found itself muddling through the more unfamiliar, complex, and oftentimes ambiguous tasks inherent in stability operations. 2 It is in this complex environment of stability operations that the Army will find itself operating for extended periods of time, and in which it will devote a significant portion of its deployable combat power. To succeed, it will require the development of a core competency in stability operationssomething the Army does not currently possess but definitely needs. What is core competency? Core competency is a business concept that describes a unique product or service that a firm capitalizes upon in order to earn a profit. 4 In a military sense core competency can be defined as a professional skill or set of skills that a Service, in this case the Army, relies upon to accomplish the missions it is assigned, and which provides a fundamental capability the Department of Defense needs to accomplish its mission. Attaining and maintaining core competency requires professional expertise, jurisdiction, and legitimacy. 5 Strategic leadership is defined by the US Army War College as
And it requires strategic leadership.
a process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy, and building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment which is marked by opportunities and threats. 6 Strategic leaders are important because they provide guidance, resources, and vision to the organizations they lead. They provide leadership and executive-level legitimacy to their profession, and provide their subordinate leaders the benefit of their accumulated skill, knowledge, and experience. They guide the organizations they lead through challenges, and it is in this critical function that their experience, skill, and knowledge are most important. be given a priority for resources, competency, and capability comparable to combat operations, and that these operations would be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities. 8 The purpose of this instruction was to make it clear to the Services that they were required to have two profoundly different core capabilities: a high-end combat capability and a capability for securing and preserving the peace through stability operations. 9 Though certainly not unique to the Army, these operations encompass tasks for which the land component possesses certain advantages and would be expected to lead. As the Department's premier land power component, the Army has rightfully taken the initiative for developing doctrine for conducting these operations. Central to this effort is a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates many of the "soft power" skills of statecraft with the core competencies of military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector. 10 Developing this core competency will better enable the Army -and the DOD --to win its current and future conflicts. While it is true that stability operations benefit from the professional expertise of the civilian sector, the Army has learned from hard experience that it often must "go it alone" by being prepared to conduct stability operations across the spectrum of conflict, from the tactical to the strategic level of operations, and for extended periods of time.
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The paper proposes that the Army has not done enough to develop a core competency in stability operations by only producing doctrine and teaching stability operations concepts at professional military education (PME) schools. To attain professional core competency it must also build a strategic leadership capability to develop the institutional capacity to lead in the development and implementation of the doctrine.
Units must be able to conduct stability operations, and Army leaders with professional technical and experiential expertise must be available to lead the effort in the absence of professional civilian expertise. To be able to build this capability the Army must look to its intrinsic professional doctrine developing institutions -its branches -and the strategic leadership capacity possessed within them to develop and maintain the "soft skills" that require a professional level of technical and experiential expertise not practically achieved in the combat arms. 13 This professional expertise is legitimized by a combination of academic knowledge, professional certification, practical application through experience, and professional relationships. It further proposes that certain branches in the Army should be responsible for recruiting, training, maintaining, and retaining a professional officer corps with a diversity of skills, experience, and professional knowledge of the "soft skills" that stability operations require.
The paper evaluates stability operations and its five primary stability tasks by defining each task and reviewing the subtasks, in order to identify relevant branch skill and expertise jurisdictions. The results are then used to assess the strategic leadership capacity, in terms of the current general officer demographic within those branches, to lead and advocate for the development of a professional core competency in stability operations. This information is then used to assess the current capacity of the Army's strategic leadership to claim core competency in stability operations.
The assessment reveals that the current strategic leadership may not be able to claim core competency in stability operations because it lacks a diversity of general officers with the professional expertise in the "soft skills" -a reference to those skills associated with the diplomatic, economic, and informational aspects of national power --that enable the core competency. The necessary broad strategic leadership could be attained by developing a senior leader expertise of those Army branches that claim the preponderance of jurisdiction over stability operations tasks. The paper takes a position that developing this professional strategic Army leadership, to include providing for operational leadership experience, is a necessary prerequisite to attaining a professional core competency in stability operations.
As a potential way ahead, the paper introduces the Army Core Enterprise as a means of providing a necessarily holistic approach in the development of a professional corps of strategic leaders that are technically and experientially competent in stability operations. The summary poses three issues that offer several critical questions that the Army Core Enterprise should consider in an effort to determine whether a technically skilled and experienced corps of strategic leaders is indeed a prerequisite to the attainment of professional core competency in stability operations.
Determining Stability Operations Task Jurisdiction
Joint Publication 3-0 defines stability operations as an overarching term which encompasses various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. environment. 15 As such, the Army has often assumed that these organizations would be the follow on effort to conduct stability operations in the aftermath of major combat operations. Recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has revealed that this is often not the case, making the development of a professional core competency in stability operations an operational necessity.
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The Army's operations doctrine manual (FM 3-0) defines stability operations as those military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions. The doctrine further states that stability operations are characterized by five primary stability tasks.
17
• providing civil security
The tasks are:
• providing civil control
• restoring essential services
• supporting effective governance
• supporting economic and infrastructure development
In the sections that follow, each stability task is examined in some detail by defining the task, examining its subtasks, and identifying branch primacies for each as appropriate.
Providing Civil Security. General Purpose Forces (GPF) must be able to protect the local population from domestic and foreign threats, and be able to assist host-nation security forces in fighting terrorists, criminal, and other small but hostile groups. If the host-nation has inadequate civil security capability, U.S. Forces will provide security while simultaneously building a host-nation capability. Due to its obvious importance, Civil Security is required prior to engaging in subsequent primary stability tasks.
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This subtask is the most manpower intensive of the five primary stability tasks, and will usually require general purpose combat force (GPCF) capability and leadership • Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, other arrangements (GPCF, MP).
• Determine disposition and constitution of national armed and intelligence services (GPCF, MI).
• Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (GPCF, CA, MP).
• Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement (GPCF, MP, MI).
• Support identification. Requires technical expertise such as forensics (MP) and the Civil Affairs task of Populace and Resources Control (PRC).
20
• Protect key personnel and facilities (GPCF, MP, MI).
• It is a primary stability task that relies heavily upon the skills and expertise of the Civil Affairs branch.
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• Establish public order and safety (CA, MP, JA).
• Establish interim criminal justice system (CA, MP, JA).
• Support law enforcement and police reform (CA, MP).
• Support judicial reform (CA, JA).
• Support property dispute resolution processes (CA, JA).
• Support justice system reform (CA, MP, JA).
• Support corrections reform (CA, MP, JA).
• Support war crimes courts and tribunals (CA, MP, JA, MI).
• Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs (CA).
Restoring Essential Services. This primary stability task is defined as those activities that go beyond civil security and civil control and address the effects of humanitarian crisis. 23 Technical and experiential expertise is required by the six branches or corps within the Army Medical Department (AMEDD).
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• Providing essential civil services, to include emergency medical care, rescue services, and basic sanitation (AMEDD, EN, MP).
In addition to expertise from the CA, MP, and JA branches, expertise from the Engineer (EN) and Logistics (LG) branches is also required. GPCF may be required for manpowerintensive subtasks. Key subtasks include:
• Mitigating the effects of dislocated civilians (CA, MP, AMEDD, LG, GPCF).
• Support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs (CA, AMEDD, LG, GPCF).
• Support nonfood relief and provide emergency shelter (CA, EN, GPCF).
• Support humanitarian demining (EN).
• Support human rights initiatives (CA, JA).
• Support public health programs to include preventing epidemic disease (CA, AMEDD).
• Support education programs (CA).
Supporting Effective Governance. Some degree of support to governance is required when a host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions. In certain circumstances international law requires military forces to provide basic civil administration functions under the auspices of a transitional military authority.
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• Support to transitional administrations (CA, JA).
This primary stability task requires skills that are resident in the CA branch, but may be performed by general military leadership with other branches in technical support. Key subtasks include:
• Support development of local governance (CA, MP).
• Support anticorruption initiatives (CA, MP, JA).
• Support elections (GPCF, CA, MP). branch. These ten key subtasks include:
Supporting Economic and
• Support economic generation and enterprise creation (CA, FI).
• Support monetary institutions and programs (CA, FI).
• Support national treasury operations (CA, FI).
• Support public sector investment programs (CA, EN, FI).
• Support private sector development (CA and FI).
• Protect natural resources and environment (EN, MP, JA).
• Support agricultural development programs (CA, EN).
• Restore transportation infrastructure (CA, EN).
• Restore telecommunications infrastructure. Technical expertise would be provided by the Signal Corps (SC), in addition to CA and EN.
• Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs (CA, EN).
The following table (Table 1) 3 of 10 2 of 10 1 of 10 1 of 10 2 of 10 1 of 10 a "P." In all five primary stability tasks two branches were also identified, based upon the intuitive assessment of subtasks, to have supporting jurisdiction. This is depicted in the table by a gray box with an "S." Jurisdiction over a task or subtask occurs when it is defined as being inclusive of a domain (branch) within which expert knowledge is applied, 27 The first observation revealed by the table is that four of five primary stability tasks rely upon skills that are not possessed by general purpose combat forces (GPCF).
GPCF are defined as those forces composed primarily of members of the combat arms branches and which provide the bulk of forces intrinsic to Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). These four primary stability tasks require skills that demand some level of technical competence normally achieved through formal education and that benefit from application through experience. The one exception is the stability task of Providing Civil Security, which has five of seven subtasks that can rely upon the manpower and leadership present in GPCF.
and is derived from the respective branch doctrine manual or the branch functions outlined in DA PAM 600-3. The Table facilitates Perhaps the most surprising result of the task to jurisdiction crosswalk is that the Finance branch could potentially have jurisdiction of five subtasks and supporting jurisdiction over one primary stability task. This assertion is based upon the unique skills and specialized degrees finance officers are encouraged to have in concentrations such as finance, accounting, business, economics, computer sciences, or information systems management. These skills and academic backgrounds are of obvious pertinence to the primary stability task of supporting economic and infrastructure development. 28 The Military Police branch has five functions which contribute broadly to stability operations competency: area security operations, maneuver and mobility support operations, law enforcement, internment and resettlement operations, and police intelligence operations. These functions relate directly to many stability tasks and subtasks and contribute to the technical and experiential expertise required to attain professional core competency in them.
The Engineer branch brings the expertise of construction engineers that are capable of managing construction projects and supervising the interior and exterior repair of facilities to include carpentry, masonry, plumbing, and electrical equipment.
They are capable of directing complex civil works programs that include water procurement and storage, flood control, and natural resource development and restoration. Engineers provide technical expertise to plan, organize, and supervise the maintenance and repair of utilities equipment, maintenance support to medical hospitals, and the installation of fixed or mobile power plants. 29 This paper will focus the examination on the strategic leadership capacity within the five Army Competitive Category (ACC) branches (CA, MP, EN, MI, FI) that have the preponderance of jurisdiction over stability operations tasks and subtasks. For ease of reference, these branches will be referred to as the "stability operations branches."
Looking across the 38 subtasks and four of the five primary stability tasks reveals that these branches provide, or have the potential to provide, the technical and experiential expertise and capability to develop a professional core competency in stability operations.
Many of these skills relate directly to stability operations tasks and subtasks.
Why Strategic Leadership?
Strategic leadership is important in any organization, and it is especially important in the Army. Army strategic leaders provide the guidance, resources, and vision to the Force. They translate national security requirements into Army strategic and operational capabilities. They provide leadership to their branches and executivelevel legitimacy to their profession, and they provide their subordinate leaders and
Soldiers the benefit of their accumulated skill, knowledge, and experience. They guide the organizations they lead through challenges, and it is in this critical function that a diversity of experience, skill, and knowledge is most important. The challenge of developing a professional core competency is no exception in this regard.
Developing core competency in any capability, but especially one that relies heavily upon professional technical and experiential expertise, must begin with leadership. In the case of stability operations, an argument could be made that strategic leadership is especially important for at least three reasons:
• First, it provides strategic and executive level expertise and legitimacy for the competency;
• Second, it provides strategic guidance and resources for the development of doctrine and organizations necessary to implement the competency;
• Third, it provides for the mentorship, vision, relevancy, and vibrancy of the junior and mid-grade officers within those branches that develop and provide the technical and experiential professional competency.
The latter is important in preserving the branch's ability to attract and retain talent so that the torch of strategic leadership competency is preserved over time.
An analysis of the current general officer demographic reveals that the Army does not currently possess a broad balance of strategic leadership in terms of overall distribution of general officer billets by branch. Because so few generals are selected from the stability operations branches it could be argued that the current strategic leadership does not have the diversity of professional knowledge and experience necessary to claim a professional core competency in stability operations. The purpose of the chart is to show that the Army invests less than 14% of its strategic leadership billets in the branches that are predominantly responsible for providing core competency in stability operations. Of these, a majority of general officers are serving in technical billets and do not have the opportunity for operational assignments that would enhance their technical and experiential skills, and thereby enhance their professional legitimacy in the Army and in their field of expertise. If one accepts the premise that strategic leadership capacity is a requirement for professional core competency, then it would be difficult for the Army to claim that it has a core competency in stability operations when so few of its general officers have the technical and experiential expertise that stability operations require.
An Enterprise Approach to Core Competent Strategic Leadership in Stability Operations
If developing a professional core competency in stability operations is important, the Army will have to "think out of the box"--something it claims to appreciate but in reality is reticent to actually do. Army senior leaders have made it clear that the watchword of the present decade is balance, and it is associated with buzzwords of the past decade like transformation, agility, and "full-spectrum." 31 The Army Enterprise seeks to restructure policy, adapt the institution, and change the culture in order to focus resources on the good of the entire Army -a "whole of Army" approach to bettering the institution.
While it is admirable that the Army acknowledges the need to be balanced, it may be helpful if the Army started with its strategic leadership. It comes down to this: to have professional strategic leadership competency in stability operations you have to have strategic leaders with the skills and expertise. If Army leadership is truly up to the challenge to "put everything on the table" then it will need a mechanism that has the charter and the leadership to do just that. Institutional Adaptation through the Army Enterprise may be that mechanism.
32 Creating a corps of strategic leaders with a broad-based professional core competency in stability operations will require such an approach. Institutional Adaptation takes a holistic view of leadership, problem solving, and decision making mechanisms in order to align policies, processes, and procedures to maximize efficiency and effectiveness across the entire Army. 33 There are several issues the Army Enterprise should examine in determining whether strategic leadership is critical to the Army's ability to claim legitimate core competency in stability operations. These questions center on whether Army senior leaders accept the arguments that:
1. Jurisdiction over the mission tasks is relevant to the core competency;
2. That technically and experientially competent strategic leadership is required to convey legitimacy and expertise to the core competency;
3. That professionally competent strategic leadership is critical to recruiting, training, maintaining, and retaining professionally skilled and experienced officers to attain the core competency. These questions center on the issue of branch jurisdiction over stability operations tasks, and depend upon whether Army doctrine leaders would agree that jurisdiction conveys doctrine responsibility and proponency. The Army's current doctrine for stability operations is an overarching one, produced for an audience of middle and senior Army leadership in the ranks of major and above. 34 The need for overarching doctrine is not challenged, but what should be challenged is the Army's ability to attain professional core competency without the doctrinal executive agency by those Army branches that have jurisdiction over the tasks. Strategic leadership in the stability branches would provide the professional associations, legitimacy and expertise necessary to recruit, train, maintain, and retain a corps of officers with the necessary professional technical skills upon which the Army could claim core competency. These leaders would also provide an executive oversight for these branches, ensuring that their members are not misused, abused, or otherwise marginalized. Strategic leaders would ensure the vision, purpose, and vitality necessary for improving stability operations doctrine. And finally, these strategic leaders would incentivize the officer corps by providing an opportunity for promotion to strategic level leadership that does not currently exist.
Is Strategic Leadership Expertise in Stability Operations
As the Army enters a new decade of persistent conflict, it would do well to reflect upon its experience over the last eight years of conflict and the increasing importance of stability operations. These operations will continue to be a staple of future conflict,
